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 1. Introduction 
SME and Entrepreneurship policy makers seeking to increase rates of new firm formation and 
subsequent wealth creation are faced with choices. The central choice is to either follow a low 
regulation route or to follow a high “support” route. The low regulation route focuses policy upon 
two areas. The first is to enable the starting of a business to take place as quickly and cheaply as 
possible. The second is to minimise the number and severity of regulations upon that business 
whilst it is trading. The US is seen as the exemplar low regulation country.  
The alternative policy is for government to provide “support” to new and small firms, funded by 
the taxpayer. It can be in the form of information, advice, training, or finance to new firms or 
existing small firms. EU countries have traditionally favoured “support” policies.  
However, Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) claimed to show that 
countries where business regulation was most burdensome are more likely to be undemocratic, 
characterised by official corruption, have larger unofficial economies and lower levels of wealth. 
This finding was highly influential, triggering the introduction of legislation in countries to lower 
the “barriers” to new business creation. EU countries, where such barriers were high, responded. 
Between 1999 and 2006 France reduced the number of days taken to start a business from 53 to 
8. Other examples are Spain where the number of days fell from 82 to 47 and Italy where they 
fell from 62 to 13.  
This paper investigates the link between business regulation and new firm formation in thirty nine 
countries. It suggests that the association between the time and costs of starting a business and 
several measures of entrepreneurship is by no means as clear as implied by Djankov et al. (2002). 
However it does find that labour market regulations depress measures of entrepreneurship. Our 
conclusion has to be that there is a need for a serious review of this policy area, with better data 
being a key requirement. 
Our results are obtained by estimating a new two-equation model while 112 averaged country 
data points covering both developed and developing countries are used. The first equation 
explains the nascent entrepreneurship rate using policy regulations and various controls. The 
second equation explains the young business entrepreneurship rate using policy regulations, 
various controls and the nascent entrepreneurship rate. This enables us to discriminate between 
direct effects on the young business entrepreneurship rate and indirect effects through the nascent 
entrepreneurship rate because the nascent phase precedes the young business phase. 
The paper begins by setting out some hypotheses on the relation between entrepreneurship and 
policy intervention. It then moves on to describe the data available and presents some simple 
tables. The modelling framework is then presented, followed by our key results. We conclude by 
reviewing the results, identifying the limitations of the study, but pointing to some provisional 
conclusions.  
2. Entrepreneurship and policy options 
Governments have a range of policies to enable Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) to 
come into existence and to grow. The simple justification for such policies is that SMEs are 
major sources of job creation, innovation and competitiveness in a modern economy and that it is 
 2
governments’ task to promote these characteristics in order to enhance the welfare of its citizens.1 
According to Lundström and Stevenson (2002) “The general goal of SME Policy is to strengthen 
the existing base of small enterprises by ensuring they can compete in the marketplace and they 
are not prejudiced because of their small size, relative to large firms”. 
To deliver such policies governments are faced with clear choices, with these being set out in 
Table 1, developed originally from Dennis (2004). The key choices are shown in the columns. 
The first is to focus attention upon lowering the entry “barriers” to new firm formation. Examples 
of such “barriers” include the length of time taken to start a business, the number and cost of any 
permits or licenses required, or the minimum capital requirements of a new firm.  
A second policy option is to reduce the “burdens” on those individuals already operating SMEs. 
Such “burdens”2 might include the difficulties over the hiring and firing of labour, obtaining 
access to credit, the severity of the tax regime or the difficulties of closing a business. These 
barriers are referred to in the Table as “barriers to expansion and growth”. 
A third policy option is to use public funds to provide finance directly and indirectly, or to 
provide information, training and advice -soft support- to both individuals considering starting a 
firm and to existing established SMEs.  
As Dennis points out, governments in different countries make different choices- the US broadly 
favouring the first two policy options over the third whereas, until recently, EU countries have 
favoured the third. Our purpose in Table 1 is not to review the practicalities of these choices but 
to theorise about their implications for new and small firms. 
The rows in Table 1 show that policy choices influence three groups of new and small firms. The 
first two are nascent entrepreneurs – defined as individuals taking active steps to start a business 
– with a distinction being made between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurs. The third group 
are the actual entrepreneurs – defined as individuals actually running a business. This third group 
consists of newly established – young – businesses, as well as established SMEs or small firms.  
We now take each of these groups in turn and theorise about the expected impact of the policies 
on each group, beginning with the two groups of nascent entrepreneurs. It would certainly be 
argued by Djankov et al. that the number of nascents would be increased if barriers to start up 
were lowered. However, it is less clear whether it is the necessity or the opportunity nascent 
entrepreneurs that will be most influenced by the lowering of entry barriers. On the one hand 
necessity entrepreneurs may be particularly strongly influenced by, for example, the costs of start 
up being lowered since these individuals are likely to have lower wealth than opportunity 
entrepreneurs. On the other hand, opportunity nascents are assumed to have a wider range of 
employment options than necessity nascents and so lowering entry costs may have a strong 
marginal effect. 
It seems likely that nascent entrepreneurs will be less influenced by barriers to growth than by 
barriers to entry on the grounds that nascents are less likely to have business experience. They 
will be less likely therefore to have actually encountered such barriers. A possible distinction is 
that opportunity nascents may have higher growth expectations than necessity nascents and so 
may be more likely to be deterred if they think they are likely to be prevented from their business 
reaching optimal size. Finally we might expect, all else equal3, for nascent rates to be higher in 
countries that provide advice, support and funds. 
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Turning now to young and established businesses we assume that they would be more strongly 
influenced by barriers to expansion and by the provision of advice and support, than by start-up 
barriers. A priori it is not clear whether the advice or the barriers would be more influential. 
The hypothesised effects described above are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Linking Entrepreneurial Groups with Policy Options  
 Lowering barriers to 
start up 
Lowering barriers to 
expansion and growth 
Providing advice, 
support and finance 
from public funds 
Nascent Opportunity 
Entrepreneurs 
Strong impact Weak impact Strong impact 
Nascent Necessity 
Entrepreneurs 
Strong impact Weak impact Strong impact 
Actual entrepreneurs 
(young businesses and 
established SMEs) 
Weak impact Strong impact Strong impact 
The table reports the hypothesised impact (strong or weak) of the policy option in the columns on the size of the 
entrepreneurial groups in the rows. 
 
3. Data on entrepreneurship rates and regulations 
Ideally, we would like to quantify all the relationships in Table 1 but, in practice, we are 
constrained by data limitations. In particular, cross-country data on the provision of advice and 
support are not available. Whilst Lundstrom and Stevenson (2005) provide a comprehensive 
description of such policies, this is restricted to only thirteen countries and there is no data on 
aggregate policy expenditure. In terms of Table 1 therefore, the relationships in the final column 
cannot be estimated. We will now provide an overview of our data on entrepreneurship rates and 
on business regulations. The variables are set out in full in the next section of this paper. 
Data on rates of entrepreneurship are derived from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). 
A distinction is made between the young business entrepreneurship rate, defined as the percent of 
the adult population that is the owner/manager of a business that is less than 42 months old, and 
the nascent entrepreneurship rate, defined as the percent of adult population that is actively 
involved in starting a new venture (Reynolds et al., 2002; Reynolds et al., 2005).  
These rates are the dependent variables in our model (see also the next section) but, following 
Table 1, we distinguish between the opportunity and necessity nascent entrepreneurship rates and 
the young business entrepreneurship rate. Our final entrepreneurship measure is the established 
business rate, defined as the percent of the adult population that is the owner/manager of a 
business that is older than 42 months. This is not a dependent variable in our model because we 
expect the impact of business regulations to be particularly important in the early stages of the 
business. However the established business rate does play a role in our empirical exercises ‘on 
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the right hand side of the equations. Full details of the various GEM measures are shown in Table 
3c.  
Data on business regulations are taken from the World Bank Doing Business (WBDB) data base. 
According to the WBDB website “The Doing Business database provides objective measures of 
business regulations and their enforcement. The Doing Business indicators are comparable across 
155 economies. They indicate the regulatory costs of business and can be used to analyse specific 
regulations that enhance or constrain investment, productivity and growth. The indicators are 
placed in categories such as ‘Starting a business’, ‘Hiring and firing of workers’, ‘Getting credit’, 
etc. The precise definition of these indicators is provided in the next section. 
As an illustration, Table 2 shows the number of days required to start a business for those 
countries participating in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor in 2005. This variable is taken 
from the WBDB category ‘Starting a business’, which is associated with the policy option 
‘lowering barriers to start up’ in Table 1.4 While in this paper we use several variables to reflect 
regulation we focus on this particular indicator because it plays such an important role in the 
influential Djankov et al. study. Table 2 also includes data on the dependent variables of this 
study, i.e. young business and nascent entrepreneurship rates, classified by opportunity and 
necessity entrepreneurship.  
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Table 2: Number of days required to start a business and entrepreneurship rates in 2005 
 Number of days 
required to start a 
business 
Young business 
entrepreneurship 
rate 
Opportunity 
nascent 
entrepreneurship 
rate 
Necessity 
nascent 
entrepreneurship 
rate 
Australia 2 4.66 4.99 0.49 
Canada 3 3.59 4.9 0.69 
United States 5 5.23 7.16 1.06 
Iceland 5 2.73 4.05 0.16 
Denmark 5 2.44 1.5 0.08 
Singapore 6 3.67 3.08 0.54 
France 8 0.68 1.46 1.1 
Jamaica 9 6.66 5.49 3.23 
Netherlands 11 1.93 1.81 0.16 
New Zealand 12 9.99 7.72 0.77 
Norway 13 5.17 3.69 0.15 
Italy 13 2.25 2.21 0.43 
Finland 14 1.88 1.85 0.16 
Sweden 16 2.54 1.33 0.17 
United Kingdom 18 2.92 2 0.29 
Latvia 18 2.77 2.91 0.6 
Switzerland 20 3.71 2.28 0.16 
Ireland 24 4.73 4.34 1.12 
Germany 24 2.71 1.91 0.67 
Chile 27 5.31 4.39 1.5 
Austria 29 2.37 2.36 0.25 
Japan 31 1.14 0.86 0.16 
Argentina 32 3.93 4.43 1.4 
Thailand 33 13.06 6.4 1.23 
Belgium 34 1.17 1.7 0.11 
South Africa 38 1.74 1.89 1.14 
Greece 38 1.6 2.69 0.52 
Hungary 38 0.82 0.37 0.11 
Spain 47 3.36 2.08 0.3 
China 48 9.4 3.67 1.16 
Croatia 49 2.5 1.66 2.11 
Mexico 58 1.36 2.78 0.6 
Slovenia 60 1.44 2.29 0.22 
Venezuela 116 7.48 11.16 6.83 
Brazil 152 8.17 1.71 1 
     
Average 30.17 3.86 3.29 0.88 
Sources: World Bank Doing Business and Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. 
 
4. Modelling and data considerations 
Model 
To examine the determinants of nascent entrepreneurship and young business entrepreneurship 
we will estimate a two-equation model explaining these entrepreneurship rates separately, while 
taking into account the interrelationship between the two variables. Our model takes the 
following form: 
 
N = f (X1, G)           (1) 
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Y = f (N, X1, X2, G)          (2) 
 
Where: 
N = nascent entrepreneurship rate 
Y = young business entrepreneurship rate 
X1 = vector of explanatory variables reflecting the supply side of entrepreneurship 
X2 = vector of explanatory variables reflecting the demand side of entrepreneurship 
G = vector of explanatory variables reflecting government intervention 
 
The setup of the model parallels Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) where survey data from the 15 EU 
Member States and the US for the year 2000 are used in the framework of a two-equation model 
to establish the effect of demographic and other variables on latent and actual entrepreneurship. 
Latent entrepreneurship is measured by the probability of a declared preference for self-
employment over employment.5 While the Grilo and Irigoyen model refers to the micro 
(individual) level, the model employed in the current paper is defined at the macro (country) 
level. The first equation explains the nascent entrepreneurship rate using policy regulations and 
various controls. The second equation explains the young business entrepreneurship rate using 
policy regulations, various controls and the nascent entrepreneurship rate. The idea is that nascent 
entrepreneurship is a necessary condition for becoming a business owner. In other words: there is 
a natural ordering in entrepreneurial engagement levels (Grilo and Thurik, 2005, 2006). Hence, 
the nascent entrepreneurship rate appears both as a dependent variable in Equation (1) and as an 
independent variable in Equation (2). In the latter equation the coefficient of the nascent rate may 
be interpreted as the ‘conversion’ effect from nascent to actual (young business) 
entrepreneurship. A higher coefficient suggests that a higher proportion of individuals who are in 
the process of starting a business actually succeed in setting up the business (i.e., they ‘convert’ 
from nascent entrepreneur into young business entrepreneur). We recognise that the conversion 
interpretation is imperfect as GEM currently does not follow individual nascent entrepreneurs 
over time (Sternberg and Wennekers, 2005). Nevertheless we consider it likely that a strong 
statistical association between nascent and actual young business entrepreneurship at the macro 
level implies a strong statistical association at the micro level (the latter implying conversion in 
the actual meaning of the word). For this reason we will use this interpretation throughout the 
paper.  
Verheul, Wennekers, Audretsch and Thurik (2002) develop an eclectic framework for the 
determinants of entrepreneurship distinguishing between the demand side and the supply side of 
entrepreneurship and government intervention.6 The demand and supply side factors create 
aggregate conditions that influence the so-called risk-reward profile of individuals which forms 
the basis for the entrepreneurial decision made at the individual level. The demand side creates 
entrepreneurial opportunities through the market demand for goods and services, whereas the 
supply side provides potential entrepreneurs that can act upon these opportunities (Verheul et al., 
2002). Examples of demand side factors are technological development, globalisation and 
industrial structure, whilst examples of supply side factors are education, age structure of 
population and availability of capital. Finally government intervention may also influence the 
demand and/or supply of entrepreneurs. Examples here include issues upon which this paper 
focuses: entry regulation, labour market regulation and the social security system.7  
We use the incumbent business ownership rate as an indicator of the demonstration effect. It has a 
special place in the eclectic framework in the sense that it directly influences the risk-reward 
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profile of individuals (instead of through the aggregate conditions created by the demand and 
supply side factors). The more common entrepreneurship is in an economy (i.e., the more 
businesses there are), the more attractively entrepreneurship is perceived, independent of existing 
opportunities or individual characteristics. Incumbent business ownership is operationalised as 
the established business rate, as measured by the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. The 
established business rate is defined as the number of owner/managers in businesses older than 42 
months as a percentage of adult population.  
In terms of our model, supply side factors influence the stock of potential (or nascent) 
entrepreneurs. These factors may also influence the stock of young business entrepreneurs. Hence 
X1 appears both in Equation (1) and in Equation (2). However, demand side factors may 
influence the young business rate rather than the nascent rate because they influence the market 
room for new businesses. Hence they influence the number of actual new-firm start-ups, and so 
X2 appears only in Equation (2).8 Government intervention factors influence both the nascent and 
the actual young business entrepreneurship rate. Furthermore, to test for the ‘conversion’ effect, 
the nascent rate is also included as an explanatory variable in the young business equation.  
Although the distinction between the supply and demand-side of entrepreneurship can be made 
conceptually, it is less clear in a world of proxy variables. To address this we will also test for the 
impact of demand side variables on the nascent rate, even though vector X2 is not in Equation (1). 
Finally, as theorised in Table 1, we distinguish between opportunity and necessity 
entrepreneurship. We assume opportunity nascents are more likely to ‘convert’ into an actual 
start-up, because of their higher skills. This would imply that the ‘conversion’ coefficient in 
Equation (2) is higher for opportunity nascents than for necessity nascents.  
Explanatory variables 
The vectors X1, X2 and G contain several variables. The supply and demand side variables of 
entrepreneurship are taken from the Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 (GCR) or the 
World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001 (WCY). Those capturing government intervention are 
taken from the World Bank Doing Business data base.  
Explanatory variables reflecting the supply and demand sides of entrepreneurship  
The supply side of entrepreneurship (vector X1) is captured by: ‘Ease of access to loans’, 
‘Venture capital availability’, ‘Working hours per year’, ‘Secondary school enrolment’ and 
‘Tertiary enrolment’. The demand side of the entrepreneurship (vector X2) includes: ‘Economic 
growth rates’, ‘FDI and technology transfer’, ‘Company-university cooperation’ and ‘Industrial 
structure’ (share of services). The exact variable descriptions are provided in Table 3a.  
Explanatory variables reflecting government intervention (vector G). 
Five categories of variables derived from the World Bank Doing Business (WBDB) methodology 
are included: These are: ‘Starting a business’, ‘Hiring and firing workers’, ‘Getting credit’, 
‘Paying taxes’ and ‘Closing a business’. Detailed descriptions are provided in Table 3b but, 
because of their significance for the paper, they are also briefly outlined below. 
The category ‘Starting a business’ identifies the bureaucratic and legal hurdles an entrepreneur 
must overcome to incorporate and register a new firm. It examines the procedures, time, and cost 
 8
involved in launching a commercial or industrial firm with up to 50 employees and start-up 
capital of 10 times the economy’s per-capita gross national income (www.doingbusiness.org).  
Measures on the flexibility of labour regulations are taken from the WBDB category ‘Hiring and 
firing workers’. It examines the difficulty of hiring a new worker, rigidity of rules on expanding 
or contracting working hours, the non-salary costs of hiring a worker, and the difficulties and 
costs involved in dismissing a redundant worker (www.doingbusiness.org). For all these variables 
higher values imply more rigid regulations. Hence the expected influence on entrepreneurship 
rates is negative. For more details on these measures we refer to Botero et al. (2004).  
We also use measures from the WBDB category ‘Getting Credit’. This quantifies two sets of 
issues—credit information registries and the effectiveness of collateral and bankruptcy laws in 
facilitating lending. Table 3b again provides full descriptions. Higher values imply that lending is 
easier, so the expected influence on entrepreneurship rates is positive.  
The WBDB category ‘Paying Taxes’ reviews the taxes that a medium-size ‘standardised’ 
company must pay or withhold in a given year. The indicators included in the present study are 
the frequency and scale of tax payments. Higher taxes are assumed to make running a business 
less attractive, so the expected sign of these variables is negative. 
Finally the WBDB category ‘Closing a business’ identifies weaknesses in existing bankruptcy 
law and the main procedural and administrative bottlenecks in the bankruptcy process. The 
indicators include the time and cost associated with going bankrupt, as well as the recovery rate 
which measures the amount of money claimants recover from an insolvent firm. When the 
recovery rate is higher, banks may be expected to be more willing to lend, hence this may have a 
positive impact on entrepreneurship. Also, when insolvency is efficiently organised, more 
entrepreneurs having to close their business may be encouraged to start a second time.9
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Table 3a: Variable descriptions and sources 
Variable Description Source 
Nascent 
entrepreneurship 
rate.  
The number of people that are actively involved in starting a new venture, as a 
percentage of adult population. An individual may be considered a nascent 
entrepreneur if the following three conditions are met: if he or she has taken 
action to create a new business in the past year, if he or she expects to share 
ownership of the new firm, and if the firm has not yet paid salaries or wages 
for more than three months (Reynolds et al., 2002, p. 38). 
GEM 
Opportunity 
nascent rate 
The number of nascent entrepreneurs (as defined above) with an opportunity 
based motive, i.e., they indicate they will start a business because they have 
perceived a business opportunity. Opportunity nascents will start a business as 
one of several possible career options. 
GEM 
Necessity nascent 
rate 
The number of nascent entrepreneurs (as defined above) with a necessity 
based motive, i.e., they indicate they will start a business because they see 
entrepreneurship as their last resort. Necessity nascents feel compelled to start 
their own business because all other work options are either nonexistent or 
unsatisfactory. 
GEM 
Young business 
entrepreneurship 
rate.  
The percent of adult population that is the owner/manager of a business that is 
less than 42 months old. 
GEM 
Established 
business rate 
The percent of adult population that is the owner/manager of a business that is 
older than 42 months. 
GEM 
Intercept poor 
countries 
Dummy variable that is 1 if the per capita income level in 2000 exceeds 
15,000 US $ in purchasing power parities, and 0 otherwise.  
WCY 
Growth Economic growth rates: gross domestic product, constant prices, annual 
percent changes.  
IMF 
Ease of access to 
loans 
“How easy is it to obtain a loan in your country with only a good business 
plan and no collateral? (1=impossible, 7=easy)”. 
GCR 
Venture capital 
availability  
“Entrepreneurs with innovative but risky projects can generally find venture 
capital in your country (1=not true, 7=true)”. 
GCR 
Working hours Average number of working hours per year. Hypothesis: In countries where 
working long hours is more common, there may be a bigger supply of 
potential entrepreneurs (as entrepreneurs – in general – also work long hours). 
WCY 
Secondary school 
enrolment 
Percentage of relevant age group receiving full-time education, 1997. WCY 
Tertiary enrolment Gross tertiary enrolment rate 1997. GCR 
FDI and 
technology transfer 
“Foreign direct investment in your country (1=brings little new technology, 
7=is an important source of new technology)”. 
GCR 
Company-
university 
cooperation 
Technology transfer between companies and universities (answers ranging 
from insufficient to sufficient) 
WCY 
Industrial structure Employment share services WCY 
Note: GEM = Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
WCY = World Competitiveness Yearbook 2001 
IMF = International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2005 
GCR = Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 
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Table 3b: Variable descriptions and sources, World Bank Doing Business indicators 
Variable Description 
 World Bank Doing Business indicators, category ‘Starting a Business’ 
Procedures The number of different procedures that a start-up has to comply with in order to obtain a 
legal status, i.e., to start operating as a legal entity. A procedure is defined as any 
interaction of the company founder with external parties (government agencies, lawyers, 
auditors, notaries). 
Time The time it takes to obtain legal status to operate a firm, in calendar days. Time captures 
the median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is necessary to complete all 
necessary procedures. 
Cost The cost of obtaining legal status to operate a firm as a percentage of per capita income. 
It includes all identifiable official expenses (fees, costs of procedures and forms, 
photocopies, fiscal stamps, legal and notary charges, etc.). 
Minimum capital The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the amount that the entrepreneur needs 
to deposit in a bank before registration starts. This variable is measured as a percentage 
of per capita income. 
 World Bank Doing Business indicators, category ‘Hiring and Firing Workers’ 
Difficulty of Hiring 
Index 
Difficulty of hiring a new worker. 
Rigidity of Hours 
Index 
Restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours. 
Difficulty of Firing 
Index 
Difficulty and expense of dismissing a redundant worker. 
Rigidity of 
Employment Index 
This variable is computed as the average of the Difficulty of Hiring Index, the Rigidity 
of Hours Index and the Difficulty of Firing Index. 
Hiring cost This indicator measures all social security payments (including retirement fund; 
sickness, maternity and health insurance; workplace injury; family allowance; and other 
obligatory contributions) and payroll taxes associated with hiring an employee. The cost 
is expressed as a percentage of the worker’s salary. 
Firing costs Cost of a redundant worker, expressed in weeks of wages. 
 World Bank Doing Business indicators, category ‘Getting Credit’ 
Legal Rights Index This index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws facilitate 
lending. 
Credit Information 
Index 
This index measures rules affecting the scope, access and quality of credit information. 
Public registry 
coverage 
A public credit registry is defined as a database managed by the public sector, usually by 
the central bank or the superintendent of banks. It collects information on the 
creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses) in the financial system and makes 
it available to financial institutions. The coverage indicator reports the number of 
individuals and firms listed in the public credit registry with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts or credit outstanding. The number is expressed as a 
percentage of the adult population. If no public registry operates, the coverage value is 0. 
Private bureau 
coverage 
A private credit bureau is defined as a private firm or non-profit organisation that 
maintains a database on the creditworthiness of borrowers (persons or businesses). The 
variable is defined analogously to the public registry coverage variable. 
Source: World Bank, www.doingbusiness.org 
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Table 3b, continued 
Variable Description 
 World Bank Doing Business indicators, category ‘Paying Taxes’ 
Number of payments The number of times the company pays taxes in a year is the number of different taxes 
multiplied by the frequency of payment for each tax. The frequency of payment includes 
advance payments as well as regular payments. 
Total tax payable This indicator measures the total amount of taxes payable by the business in the second 
year of operation except for labour taxes. Labour taxes (such as payroll taxes and social 
security contributions) are included in the hiring cost indicator (see above). The total 
amount of taxes is the sum of all the different taxes payable after accounting for 
deductions and exemptions. The taxes withheld but not paid by the company are not 
included. Payable taxes are presented as a share of gross profit (defined as sales minus 
cost of goods sold and labour costs). 
  
 World Bank Doing Business indicators, category ‘Closing a Business’ 
Time Time to go through insolvency in calendar years. This variable captures the average time 
taken to go through insolvency, as estimated by bankruptcy lawyers. Information is 
collected on the sequence of the bankruptcy procedures and on whether any procedures 
can be carried out simultaneously. Delays due to legal derailment tactics that parties to 
the bankruptcy may use -in particular, the extension of response periods or appeals- are 
considered. 
Cost Cost of the bankruptcy proceedings, as a percentage of the estate value of the bankrupt 
business.10 The cost of the bankruptcy proceedings is calculated on the basis of survey 
responses by practicing insolvency lawyers. Costs include court costs as well as fees of 
insolvency practitioners, independent assessors, lawyers, accountants and the like. Bribes 
are excluded. 
Recovery rate The recovery rate, which calculates how many cents on the dollar claimants (creditors, 
tax authorities, and employees) recover from an insolvent firm. This variable more or 
less combines the former two variables as the cost of bankruptcy proceedings is deducted 
from the initial available money, and the recovery rate is then calculated as the present 
value of what is left.11
Source: World Bank, www.doingbusiness.org 
5. Empirical analysis 
Methodology and sample 
We estimate Equations (1) and (2) using data for 47 countries over the period 2000-2005. 
Unfortunately the data are not complete. First, data for the established business rate are only 
available for the years 2002-2005. But, as the demonstration effect has been found to be 
empirically relevant in earlier studies (Wennekers, van Stel, Thurik and Reynolds, 2005), it is 
important to include this variable in the model. Second, several countries participated in GEM 
only once or twice. Third, there are missing values for some independent variables for the 
countries of Croatia, Uganda, Jamaica and Latvia. All in all, this provides 124 observations. 
Finally, several test regressions revealed that some observations do not fit in our models in the 
sense that they have extreme residual values for which we have no sound explanation. After 
removing these observations we have an unbalanced panel of 112 observations distributed over 
39 countries. Using this sample, all regressions pass the Jarque-Bera test on normality of the 
residuals.12 The distribution of these observations over the countries is shown in the Appendix. 
The data set comprises variables that vary over time, as well as time-invariant variables. The 
GEM variables (the nascent, young business and established business entrepreneurship rates) and 
growth of GDP vary over time, whereas the GCR and WCY variables are time-invariant. Those 
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from WBDB are available for the period 2003-2005. We set the values for 2002 equal to those of 
2003.13
In our estimation models we depart from a baseline model which includes the economic growth 
rate and the established business rate. These variables are important as they capture the business 
cycle effect and the demonstration effect, respectively. 
In Equation (1) we also include a ‘poor country’ dummy. It is often observed that 
entrepreneurship rates are higher in poor countries because it is more often necessity driven, or 
more associated with the rural sector. We include a dummy to correct for this. We choose a per 
capita income level of 15,000 USDs in purchasing power parities (year 2000) as the cut-off point. 
The Appendix shows the countries defined as poor. In Equation (2) the inclusion of this dummy 
is not required because the nascent entrepreneurship rate (both opportunity and necessity driven) 
is included as an additional explanatory variable. 
To summarise, our baseline model includes a dummy for poor countries, growth of GDP and the 
established business rate as explanatory variables for the opportunity and necessity nascent rates 
(Equation 1). The opportunity and necessity nascent rates, growth of GDP and the established 
business rate are used as explanatory variables for the young business entrepreneurship rate 
(Equation 2). 
When estimating Equations (1) and (2), we cannot include all explanatory variables from Tables 
3a and 3b simultaneously because of multicollinearity. To obtain an overall picture we computed 
(auxiliary) regressions, each time adding one variable to the baseline model. The regressions 
were estimated using OLS. As our data base contains very heterogeneous countries we computed 
standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity. Results of these auxiliary regressions are 
presented in a working paper version of the present article (van Stel, Storey and Thurik, 2006).  
We then build a complete multivariate model. For each dependent variable we combine all 
significant variables from the auxiliary regressions into one model specification which also 
includes the baseline variables. Next, we remove the non-significant variables, to end up with a 
model including only those explanatory variables which have a significant impact (next to the 
baseline variables). In this process we also take into consideration some restrictions that arise 
from multicollinearity. For instance, as the Rigidity of Employment Index is an average of three 
sub-indices (see Table 3b), we cannot include the sub-indices and the overall index 
simultaneously. For the opportunity nascent rate and the young business rate, this led us to 
include only the combined indicator.  
The final results of the procedure described above are shown in Table 4. In reading this table it is 
important to realise that empty cells imply a non-significant influence. For instance, the number 
of procedures has no significant impact on the young business rate. In addition, for each 
explanatory variable from Table 3a or 3b not included in Table 4, it holds that the variable has no 
impact on any of the entrepreneurship rates. For instance, the time it takes to obtain legal status to 
operate a firm (see Table 3b) has been tested to have no significant impact on the various 
entrepreneurship rates. Again, the different steps leading to Table 4 are shown in van Stel, Storey 
and Thurik (2006). 
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Table 4: Estimation results 
 Equation (1) Equation (2) 
 
 Opportunity 
nascent rate 
Opportunity 
nascent rate 
Necessity  
nascent rate 
Young 
business rate 
 
Intercept 1.91 
(1.2) 
7.32 * 
(1.7) 
-.27 
(0.3) 
.18 
(0.7) 
Intercept poor countries 1.84 *** 
(4.4) 
1.48 *** 
(3.1) 
.90 *** 
(4.9) 
 
Growth .12 ** 
(2.4) 
.13 ** 
(2.4) 
-.015 
(0.5) 
.037 
(1.1) 
Established business rate .31 *** 
(4.8) 
.29 *** 
(4.6) 
.11 *** 
(4.4) 
.26 *** 
(7.9) 
Opportunity nascent rate    .33 *** 
(5.2) 
Necessity nascent rate    .75 *** 
(5.2) 
Procedures    .043 ** 
(2.0) 
 
Minimum capital  -.0041 ** 
(2.6) 
-.0059 *** 
(2.7) 
-.0009 ** 
(2.5) 
 
Rigidity of Hours Index    -.012 *** 
(5.7) 
 
Rigidity of Employment Index  -.020 *** 
(2.7) 
-.015 ** 
(2.0) 
 -.012 *** 
(3.1) 
Firing costs    .0086 *** 
(3.7) 
 
Private bureau coverage  .011 *** 
(2.7) 
.010 *** 
(2.7) 
 .0036 
(1.6) 
Recovery rate    -.010 *** 
(3.1) 
 
Tertiary enrolment (GCR) $ .028 *** 
(2.6) 
-.15 
(1.4) 
  
Employment share services & 
(WCY) 
-.032 * 
(1.7) 
-.11 * 
(1.8) 
.014 * 
(1.7) 
 
Interaction variable: 
Tertiary enrolment × 
Employment share services 
 .0025 * 
(1.7) 
  
     
R2 .576 .611 .724 .856 
N 109 109 110 112 
Note: Absolute heteroskedasticity-consistent t-values are between brackets. &Ecuador and Jordan missing in WCY. 
$Taiwan missing in GCR. *** Significant at 1% level, ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level. 
 
Interpretation of results 
Table 4 contains several important results. First, the impact of entry regulations on the three 
entrepreneurship rate measures is limited. Of the four entry regulation variables (WBDB category 
‘Starting a Business’), only the minimum capital requirement is an obstacle for entrepreneurship. 
One interpretation of this is that the creative entrepreneur either overcomes or avoids bureaucratic 
burdens such as the number of procedures or the amount of time that is required to start up, even 
if these are relatively heavy. However the minimum capital requirement may be a more serious 
barrier because even skilful entrepreneurs may not be able to overcome this without access to 
assets. This might explain the negative sign. Note however that the impact of this variable on 
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actual entrepreneurship (the young business rate) emerges only in an indirect way, viz. through 
the effect of nascent entrepreneurs.  
Second, in contrast to the entry regulation measures and our initial theorising, we find strong 
negative effects on nascent rates of the labour market regulation measures ‘rigidity of 
employment’ and ‘rigidity of hours’. Where labour market regulations are more rigid, 
entrepreneurship rates are lower. Formulated differently, in countries where the flexibility of 
employers to hire and fire employees is higher, the various rates of entrepreneurship also tend to 
be higher. Two explanations for this are offered. On the side of employees, the safety of their 
paid job is less which may make them more likely to decide to start their own business (push 
effect). On the side of the entrepreneurs, they have more flexibility in running their business 
which makes business ownership more attractive (pull effect). Both effects  imply higher 
entrepreneurship rates. In support of our theorising, however, the rigidity of employment index 
acts as an obstacle for the young business entrepreneurship rate both in a direct manner (the 
variable is significant at 1% level in Equation 2) and in an indirect manner through the 
(opportunity) nascent rate. 
Third, we find empirical support for the ‘conversion’ effect: the coefficients on the nascent rate 
variables in Table 4 (Equation 2) are highly significant.14 Countries with more nascent 
entrepreneurs also have more entrepreneurs in actual young businesses. Perhaps somewhat 
surprisingly, nascent entrepreneurs with a necessity based motive are more likely to set up a 
business than those who are opportunity based. This may be because of the lack of alternative 
employment options induces more necessity nascents to actually start businesses because they 
(are forced to) put more effort in the start-up process. Note however that this does not imply that 
necessity nascents are more ‘successful’ in terms of economic performance. Research by van 
Stel, Carree and Thurik (2005) shows that in developing countries – where the number and share 
of necessity based entrepreneurs is high compared with developed countries (see Acs, Arenius, 
Hay and Minniti, 2005, pp. 18-21) – higher levels of entrepreneurship contribute negatively to 
economic growth. This may reflect the low human capital of entrepreneurs in these countries,15 
necessity start-ups have lower survival and growth.  
Fourth, the determinants of opportunity and necessity entrepreneurship are different. GDP growth 
rates have a significantly positive effect on opportunity rates but no effect on necessity rates. This 
is in line with our expectations: higher growth rates reflect a higher demand for goods and 
services, creating more opportunities to start new businesses. The necessity nascent rate is not 
affected as these individuals are not influenced by demand. Furthermore, whereas opportunity 
entrepreneurship is influenced by higher education levels (tertiary enrolment), necessity 
entrepreneurship is not. This emphasises that opportunity based entrepreneurs have higher human 
capital levels compared with necessity based entrepreneurs. The positive effect of tertiary 
enrolment on the opportunity nascent rate (first column of Table 4) suggests that individuals with 
higher education levels are more likely to start businesses compared with others.16 The second 
column of Table 4 shows the effects of tertiary enrolment and the share of services interact. So 
higher tertiary enrolment rates only leads to more entrepreneurs if the share of services in the 
economy is sufficiently high, and vice versa.17
Fifth, when considering the effect of the business regulations categories ‘Getting Credit’, ‘Paying 
taxes’ and ‘Closing a business’, the variable ‘Private bureau coverage’, is significantly positive 
suggesting that if better information about creditworthiness of potential borrowers is available, 
credit rationing by lenders to small businesses will occur less often (Armour and Cumming, 
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2005). The influence of tax systems seems to be marginal while for bankruptcy regulation we 
only find a counter-intuitive result for the necessity entrepreneurship rate (a negative sign on 
recovery rate). This is discussed below. 
Finally, the necessity entrepreneurship equation in Table 4 has several counter-intuitive findings. 
First it shows the number of procedures with which a start-up has to comply, and the firing costs 
of a redundant worker are positively associated with necessity rates. Second, the negative sign for 
the recovery rate in case of bankruptcy is also contrary to our expectations. Our explanation for 
this is that, in countries where business regulations are particularly burdensome, business owners 
are more reluctant to register their firms and so are more likely to operate in the informal 
economy (World Bank, 2005, p. 3). Countries with more regulations are also poor countries 
(World Bank, 2005, p. 3) where the share and number of necessity entrepreneurs is relatively 
high (Acs et al., 2005). In short, these counter-intuitive findings imply that many necessity based 
entrepreneurs in developing countries escape regulatory regimes by setting up their business in 
the informal sector.18
6. Conclusion 
This paper has examined the relationship, across 39 countries, between regulation and 
entrepreneurship using a new two-equation model. It generates three key results. First, it finds no 
significant impact on nascent or young business formations of administrative considerations such 
as the time, the cost, or the number of procedures needed to start a business. The only exception 
is that the minimum capital requirement required to start a business does seem to lower 
entrepreneurship rates across countries. Given the explicit link made by Djankov et al. (2002) 
between the speed and ease with which businesses may be established in a country and its 
economic performance – and the enthusiasm with which this link has been grasped by European 
Union policy makers – our findings imply this link needs reconsidering. Our results are more 
compatible with a Baumol (1990) inspired view that, whilst circumstances may influence the 
nature of entrepreneurship in society, it remains ever-present. We therefore do not subscribe to 
the view that “heavily regulated” countries (in terms of entry regulations) need only to reduce 
such “burdens” in order to become more enterprising and by implication more wealthy. What 
seems more likely is that entry regulation influences the distribution of business activity between 
the formal and the informal economy, rather than influencing the total volume of activity. 
Second, we find substantial differences between the determinants of opportunity entrepreneurship 
and those of necessity entrepreneurship. Whilst opportunity entrepreneurship is influenced by 
higher education, necessity entrepreneurship is not. Our findings are compatible with the view 
that many necessity entrepreneurs in developing countries avoid business regulations by starting 
and operating a business in the informal sector. This result stresses the importance of measuring 
numbers of formal and informal entrepreneurs separately (Verheul, van Stel and Thurik, 2006).19  
Thirdly, we find it is labour market, rather than entry, regulations which exert a stronger influence 
upon both the nascent and the young business rate. This is surprising since we would have 
expected nascent entrepreneurs – those considering starting a business – to have been more 
influenced by immediate priorities, rather than factors that only come into play once the business 
is established.  
We remain conscious of two limitations of our work. First, the WBDB indicators are generally 
defined for relatively large new firms. They relate to a ‘standardised’ firm, defined as a 
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domestically owned limited liability company with between 5 and 50 employees one month after 
start-up. As the bulk of the entrepreneurs captured by GEM operate in very much smaller 
businesses, we implicitly assume that country differences in regulations are stable across size-
classes. In other words, the countries where the WBDB regulation indicators are high for larger 
new firms are the same countries where it is difficult to begin a smaller new firm.  
Our second limitation is that we would have liked in this paper to have examined the factors 
influencing the rate at which individuals “convert” from being a nascent to a young business 
owner. The extent to which this transition, or conversion, rate was influenced by entry barriers 
would have been a stronger test than the one used here, but unfortunately the available data 
preclude it. Ideally we would like a panel data set in which individuals are tracked through these 
phases, whereas the GEM data are discrete snapshots. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, we feel the current paper has re-opened an important debate on 
a key policy area. If administrative entry barriers play only a very modest role in explaining 
variations in enterprise creation rates, then the current “fashion” for countries to compete by 
lowering these barriers needs to be reviewed.  
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Appendix 1: Estimation sample  
Table A1 lists the distribution of observations in our estimation sample over the countries. A 
country can have 4 observations maximum (for the years 2002-2005). It is also indicated whether 
the country is ranked as a poor country. In total we have 112 observations 26 of which are of poor 
countries. 
 
Table A1 Estimation sample 
Country N Poor 
country? 
Country N Poor country? 
Argentina 4 Y Japan 3  
Australia 4  Jordan 1 Y 
Belgium 4  Mexico 2 Y 
Brazil 1 Y Netherlands 4  
Canada 4  New Zealand 3  
Chile 3 Y Norway 4  
China 2 Y Poland 2 Y 
Denmark 4  Portugal 1  
Ecuador 1 Y Russia 1 Y 
Finland 3  Singapore 4  
France 4  Slovenia 4  
Germany 4  South Africa 4 Y 
Greece 1  Spain 4  
Hong Kong 3  Sweden 3  
Hungary 3 Y Switzerland 3  
Iceland 4  Taiwan 1  
India 1 Y Thailand 1 Y 
Ireland 4  United States 4  
Israel 2  United Kingdom 4  
Italy 3     
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1 Storey (2003) argues that this justification is in fact too simple because government intervention can have 
undesirable side-effects such as increased bureaucracy through maintaining (unproductive) policy programs. He 
argues that the correct justification of government intervention is the existence of market failures such as 
imperfect information on the private benefits of starting a business or imperfect information on the private 
benefits of obtaining external advice. 
2 The term “burdens” is placed in inverted commas since, although it is common parlance it is pejorative, implying 
that there are clear costs and no benefits. On the face of it, speeding and simplifying the procedures for business 
creation seems to be a highly beneficial policy. If businesses are more easily created these firms constitute a 
competitive threat to existing businesses, compelling them to compete or to go out of business. A second advantage 
is that, in some instances, the business licensing procedure is the focus of corruption, with those paying bureaucrats 
obtaining their licenses more quickly. The elimination of such corruption has considerable and wide-ranging social 
and economic benefits. 
However, as with most legislative change, there are some important contrary arguments. First, the prime function of 
the business registration process is to enable some protection of consumers from fraudulent or incompetent business 
owners. Nobody would suggest that untrained doctors or surgeons should be allowed to practice, and registration 
provides the basis for the minimum check of the qualifications and track record of such individuals.  
The wide acceptance of the need for doctors to register is presumably because their incompetence could kill people. 
But the same might also be said for an individual wishing to establish a business as a driving instructor. Similar 
arguments might then be applied to electricians who could electrocute themselves or other people if they made 
errors. Like doctors, both driving instructors and electricians could kill those in their charge, so raising the question 
of whether the same business licensing/ regulations are appropriate for all three types of business. If not, then this 
raises the supplementary question of the nature of differences, and on what basis should such differences exist. 
Extending the argument, we might also all wish to be protected from the financially unscrupulous. We might view it 
to be the role of government to ensure that rogues are identified and prohibited from trading. Again, registration is a 
minimum condition for identifying such individuals. In short, whilst we might all agree that excessive business 
licensing is undesirable, we might not all agree on the balance between the interests of those in the business 
community and consumers or others in society.  
3 In practice holding all else equal is difficult since, as we noted earlier EU countries with relatively high tax regimes 
favour the provision of advice more than the low tax regime of the United States. 
4 It is important to note that the WBDB indicators for ‘Starting a business’ focus on relatively large start-ups as their 
‘standardised’ firm is a domestically owned limited liability company which has between 5 and 50 employees one 
month after start-up. This is far from ideal as many of the entrepreneurs captured by GEM operate in smaller 
businesses. However, a major advantage of the WBDB data base is that the measures are readily available, and that 
they are comparable across countries. Our implicit assumption has to be that country differences in regulations are 
stable across different types of firms (in terms of size, legal form or activity). 
5 Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer (2001) use a similar approach while their model should be interpreted as a 
reduced form. Grilo and Thurik (2005) use 2004 survey data of the 15 ‘old’ Member States of the EU applying 
the original Grilo and Irigoyen (2006) model. 
6 An update of the eclectic framework can be found in Audretsch, Grilo and Thurik (2007). 
7 Supply side factors of entrepreneurship often interact with government intervention factors. For instance, 
education obviously influences the skills of people required to become an entrepreneur (supply side factor). 
However, education itself can be influenced by government intervention through spending more money on the 
education system. 
8 Note that some of the determinants of the young business rate may impact this rate not only through more start-
ups but also through the survival effect. For instance, it may be hypothesised that countries with a higher average 
education level of the population not only produce more start-ups but also produce more start-ups that survive. 
This effect is also captured in the model as the young business rate measures all owner/managers of firms 
younger than 3.5 years. 
9 Armour and Cumming (2005) investigate a different aspect of bankruptcy law in relation to entrepreneurship 
levels, viz., the time to discharge from personal bankruptcy.  
10 The data are computed for a ‘standardised case’, where a limited liability company has downtown real estate 
as its major asset. The company runs a hotel with 201 employees. 
11 The third factor influencing the recovery rate is whether or not the firm survives as a going concern. In case 
the business is liquidated there is an additional loss of value impacting the recovery rate negatively (see World 
Bank, 2005, p. 69). 
12 12 Observations were removed in the outlier analysis. 
13 Also, some variables are available for 2004 and 2005 only. In those cases the values for both 2002 and 2003 
were set equal to those of 2004. 
14 Again we recognise that the conversion interpretation is to some extent questionable as we do not follow 
individual nascent entrepreneurs over time. 
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15 See also van Stel and Storey (2004) who provide (indirect) empirical evidence that (UK) regions where more 
start-ups are subsidised have lower economic performance. The interpretation of the authors is that the subsidy 
programs cause many individuals with low human capital levels to start businesses. As these low skilled business 
owners do not grow their businesses and often leave the market after a while, the net effect on regional economic 
performance may well be negative. 
16 This result is in line with Reynolds, Hay and Camp (1999) who conclude that the larger a country’s investment 
in education at the tertiary level, the higher is the rate of new firm formation 
17 It is straightforward to compute that the turning point for the effect of higher education lies at a share of 
services level of 61%, i.e., only when the share of services in an economy is higher than 61%, will an increase in 
the tertiary enrolment rate contribute to higher opportunity entrepreneurship rates.  
18 Verheul, van Stel and Thurik (2006) show that women may be more involved in informal entrepreneurship 
than men. Based on an analysis using Global Entrepreneurship Monitor data they consider it likely that for 
developing countries a substantial number of entrepreneurs measured in GEM’s entrepreneurship rates are 
owner-managers of unregistered businesses. Based on their analysis the authors also argue that the distinction 
between the formal and informal economy should be an important topic for the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
research agenda: how many ‘informal’ entrepreneurs are included in the entrepreneurship measures of GEM’s 
Adult Population Survey, and how does this affect empirical analyses that make use of the GEM data base? This 
issue is important in particular for studies focusing on GEM countries with large informal sectors. 
19 The call for measuring formal and informal entrepreneurship separately is also supported by observations 
made by Capelleras, Mole, Greene and Storey (2005). They argue that regulation does not affect 
entrepreneurship but merely influences the nature or form of that entrepreneurship. In other words it influences 
the distribution of entrepreneurship between registered and unregistered businesses. Unfortunately, the GEM 
data does not tell us what types of firm are included in actual entrepreneurship. In other words how many of the 
actual businesses are registered, and hence appear in official statistics and how many are unregistered? Amongst 
the unregistered there are two categories, the first are those which are legal, but merely are too small to appear in 
official figures, and the second are those which are illegal. We also do not know from the GEM data how many 
are in these two categories because GEM follows individuals without considering the number of businesses they 
have. So, an individual in a heavily regulated economy may well choose to establish more businesses which are 
below the official registration threshold, whereas in a lightly regulated economy, an individual may choose to 
establish a single business but one that is registered. GEM data may be useful to investigate these types of 
questions. However, for this the setup of the GEM survey would have to be modified. In particular, we would 
need to know how many businesses each entrepreneur has and also whether these businesses are registered or 
unregistered. 
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